Opinion is split on whether the indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of President Al Bashir of Sudan is a good or a bad thing for peace in Darfur. Given the scale of the tragedy there however, it’s perhaps understandable that much of this debate is highly polarised, based as it is so often on an overly simplistic understanding of what’s really happening. There is no question that the intervention of the ICC has further complicated what was already a highly complex situation. President Bashir’s response in expelling the principal aid NGO’s in Darfur has already added to the misery of those most vulnerable and is another chapter in a seemingly endless litany of events which defy easy explanation.
In May last year for example, the Darfur conflict finally came to Khartoum as rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the capital leaving their wreckage and dead bodies in the streets of Omdurman. A few months later seven peacekeepers from the joint African Union and United Nations mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were killed and 22 wounded as they returned from a patrol to investigate rebel claims that two of their fighters had been killed in North Darfur. This attack, the worst suffered by the Mission so far, was highly organised and carried out by some 200 gunmen equipped with heavy calibre weapons against which the lightly equipped peacekeepers had little protection. Alas more peacekeepers have been killed since then as UNAMID try to make sense of a seemingly senseless situation.
The prevailing narrative has it that the Darfur conflict is essentially an ethnic war resulting from longstanding enmity between African farmers and Arab nomads, principally centred on the competition for land and water. That the rebels represent the Africans and that the Arabs are supported by the Sudanese government who prosecute the war through a surrogate militia known infamously as the Janjaweed. Meanwhile, the Chinese government, which buys two thirds of Sudan’s oil, stands idly by and chooses not to use its influence to pressurise the Khartoum regime to stop atrocities and the wholesale abuse of human rights.
While this black and white characterisation of the situation in Darfur is superficially true, the reality is much more complicated and multi-layered. What is clear though, is that over 2.5m people have been displaced and now live in makeshift camps and some 200,000-300,000, depending whose figures you believe, have been killed or have died from starvation and disease as result of the war. Whatever the narrative, there is no question that this is an immense human tragedy.
But what is the reality in Darfur? Well if you talk to ordinary Darfurians, as I have for the past two and a half years, they will tell you that the genesis of the crisis reaches back to and beyond the 1984 drought from which they never recovered. A growing population combined with dwindling resources produced the conditions for conflict. Under-investment by successive governments aggravated these conditions, bolstering feelings of neglect, resentment and lack of representation in both central and regional government. Add to this volatile mixture a breakdown of the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution which has further exacerbated tribal rivalries, not just pitching Arabs against Africans but Arabs against Arabs and Africans against Africans. But even this is an oversimplification. Who, for example, actually represents the people of Darfur, as the two rebel movements who sat at the negotiating table in Abuja in 2006 have subsequently divided and subdivided into over 30 factions and some of these have even begun to fight each other? Furthermore, some militias and armed groups who claim not to have been paid what they are owed have taken to banditry to sustain themselves. Car hijackings occur regularly and the humanitarian agencies have cut relief supplies as a consequence of attacks against their convoys. Last year alone banditry resulted in the theft of 60 World Food Program (WFP) contracted trucks. Many of these trucks are still missing and their drivers unaccounted for, two drivers were killed and over 700 tons of the food they were carrying was stolen. In the midst of all this turmoil, fighting has escalated on the border between Chad and Darfur, displacing even more innocent Darfurians; UNAMID, the force sent to protect them finds itself under attack and the humanitarian NGOs who deliver most of the aid to the refugees have been expelled by the Government for allegedly supplying information to the ICC. No wonder the problem is proving so intractable.
UNAMID’s predecessor the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) came under much criticism for allowing the situation to deteriorate under its watch. But what could we honestly expect a force of less than 7,000 soldiers and police to achieve in an area the size of France, short of equipment, starved of resources and with a weak and creeping mandate? Let’s get real. Compare their strength, for example, with the force of 50,000 that went into Bosnia, a country barely the size of Belgium. The African Union (AU) held the line while the rest of the international community, principal amongst them and contrary to popular perception the Chinese, convinced the Sudanese government to accept a larger and more capable force. The result was the authorisation of a 26,000 strong UNAMID, which took over on 1 January 2008. However, generating and deploying this force has brought with it its own set of challenges.
Although UNAMID has an impressively robust mandate, shortly after I left and six months into its mission it still numbered only around 9,000. The best estimates then were that it might get to 80 per cent strength by the end of the year, well by the beginning of March this year they had still not reached this target. Until they do it will be extremely difficult for them to make a significant difference across such a vast and inaccessible area. The mission is also still short of the force multipliers that would enable it to use its limited numbers more effectively. In particular the air mobility necessary to move troops rapidly and the increased reach and firepower that would come with the armed helicopters they were promised well over a year ago and which would have prevented many of the recent attacks against them. This is exactly what undermined the credibility of AMIS and which UNAMID was supposed to overcome.
But security is not just about the size and capacity of the peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers must have a peace to keep, so where is the parallel political track? Given the complexities of the situation, even obtaining an effective ceasefire is proving extremely difficult. With the fragmentation of the rebel movements, the fighting on the border and the breakdown of law and order, it is difficult to know where to start. Trying to obtain a political agreement that deals with the root causes of the conflict in such an environment is a very tough challenge. Although recently mediation efforts between the Government and the JEM do seem to have made some progress as a consequence of the Doha talks the ICC indictment has again raised questions as to whether this can be exploited.
So without security and uncertainty over the prospect of progress towards a political agreement that might provide the basis for it the third element essential to sustainable peace in Darfur, moving from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and development, seems a long way away. The situation looks bleak and this is reflected in the commentary both locally and internationally. A pall of pessimism hangs over Darfur which further depresses the opportunities for progress.
Where do we go from here? First, it is incumbent on troop contributing countries to commit and deploy units with the required technical capabilities. But we should stop fixating on numbers and concentrate on capability. Helicopters, for example, particularly the armed variety, delivered now would do much to extend UNAMID’s reach and firepower. Engineering and logistical units are also urgently required to facilitate the speedy deployment of the remainder of the force. Second, the political process must be re-energised , especially at the grass roots and amongst Darfurian civil society who need to escape the negativity of the current narrative and feel the prospect of progress. As a tribal leader in South Darfur recently told me, “Forget the Government and the Movements it’s time our voices were heard.” Finally we need to break the vicious circle of violence so graphically characterised by the killing of UNAMID peacekeepers and the intransigence of the government and rebel movements which obstructs the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevents the reconstruction and development that is so urgently needed.