Albany Blog

At Albany Associates 2009 conference on ‘Strategic Communications in countries emerging from violent conflict‘, Alastair Campbell shared lessons of his experience dealing with a number of crises.

He listed fifteen rules:

1.       Know the difference between a genuine crisis and a media driven frenzy. The former are rare, the latter common.

2.       Once you have decided it is a crisis situation, operate the OST rule. Set clear Objectives. Define the Strategy. Only then think about Tactics.

3.       Never lose sight of the big picture.

4.       Centralise.

5.       If the crisis needs new policy, structures or personnel to manage it, put them in place quickly.

6.       If it is a crisis playing out across the media, rebut with speed and aggression.

7.       Decide the single figure to whom people will most look for leadership. Usually the person at the top but…

8.       Horses for courses. Understand that sometimes the top person, e.g. in business/military, may be a dreadful communicator if not used to it .

9.       Agree basic messages and never tire of saying them.

10.   Organise every part of every day for the tactical implementation of strategy.

11.   Organise your communications as far as they need to go. Take account of possible different audiences.

12.   Put extra effort into the big moments.

13.   Ensure proper internal comms. Don’t forget your own people may get most messages through media. Make sure they hear from you first.

14.   Remember it will end.

15.   Throughout the crisis, have someone working on re-entry to normal strategy once the crisis is over.

Drawing on his experience of ten years alongside Tony Blair, and his considerable understanding of the modern media, Alastair brought to the conference a unique perspective and spoke of his experience of dealing with communications issues at the highest level during the wars in Kosovo, Iraq and post 9/11; he delivered a stimulating and challenging session.

As someone considered a leading international ‘spin doctor’, it was provocative that the central premise of Alastair Campbell’s address rejected the link between ‘spin’ and strategic communications, and attempted to dispel the often negative and mistrusting connotations associated with ‘spin’. According to Alastair, the concept of strategic communications is chronically misunderstood, to the detriment of government departments and intergovernmental organisations. Rather than being a force for manipulation, strategic communications is an essential process which allows policy makers the space they need to get from A to B.

He went on to present strategic communications within the context of an increasingly negative and aggressive multi-media battle for domination of the agenda, affirming that within this environment “the idea of planning what the government is doing, and creating a sense of order in the media landscape should not be controversial.”

As expected, the presentation inspired a diverse array of questions. In response to Alastair’s assertion that rather than setting policy, strategic communications presents policy to the public on behalf of policy makers, one commentator proposed a cyclical scenario in which something that starts as a policy message can then reinforce and further shape policy, citing communications on “the war on terror” as a possible example. Alastair maintained that strategic communications does not set policy; rather it presents policy set by policy makers. For strategic communications to work, policies must be sound and unanimously supported by the organisations that promote them.  Leading on from this, a UN representative highlighted the difficulties of communication when the relevant parties cannot agree on the message. Finally, it was argued that although new media has democratised communication and made it easier to galvanise support for or against a policy, the government doesn’t appear to respond. The protests against the Iraq war were given as an example. Alastair concluded that listening to the concerns of others must not distract politicians from the task of making difficult decisions. He said that Tony Blair believed his decision was right on Iraq, despite the loss of popularity.

With just a few months to run on the mandate of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), can international policy makers find the right strategy to set the country on the road to recovery after decades of turmoil?

Is Somalia best characterized as a state held hostage to clan in-fighting, corruption and intransigence? Or is it really the new home of al Qu’ida inspired Islamic extremism?

In the wake of the Ugandan suicide bombings is the international community’s current engagement in Somalia able to stem the growth and spread of extremism from the Horn of Africa and out into the wider East African region or is there a need for a new approach ?

The Frontline Club plays host to a panel of experts engaged in Somalia on a day-to-day basis, to discuss why Somalia matters, the future of the country, the role of the international community and to consider the de facto realities from the armchair theories. Date: Thursday 29 July 2010, http://frontlineclub.com/events/2010/07/third-party-event-somalia-on-the-brink—again.html 7pm.

Chaired by Angus Walker, ITN News
Speakers:

Abdirahman Omar Osman, Minister of Information, Transitional Federal Government of Somalia

Babatunde Taiwo, Senior Analyst, African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM)

Simon Haselock, AU/UN Information Support Team Project Director (Albany Associates)

As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius noted recently, the Rolling Stone article that did for Gen Stanley McChrystal is a “wake-up call for both sides [the military and the press] that the cosiness that has evolved over the past decade.” Perhaps the fact that McChrystal made such unguarded remarks in the first place is merely symptomatic of the cosiness that Ignatius describes.

This clearly marks an unhealthy measure of disarray in the American camp. When Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew to Afghanistan to promise and reassert continuity of American purpose to the key stakeholders: “We need to tell our story. It needs to be done well. It needs to be told smartly.”

However, there are differences of opinion on how to go about this, a fact which contributes to the sense of disarray. Ignatius suggests Mullen, for one, prefers a more traditional approach to public affairs “in which military spokesmen provide as much information as possible, and offer access to the media, but without the “stratcom” ambitions and dangers.”

Indeed, Mullen set out his stall in the October 2009 issue of the Joint Force Quarterly (though the article was made public in late August 2009) to which he contributed an article “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics.”

“Our messages lack credibility because we haven’t invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven’t always delivered on promises.”

He goes on:

“I would argue that most strategic communication problems are not communication problems at all. They are policy and execution problems.”

Mullen’s bottom line is essentially less strat and more comm: sound, successful policy and action speaks for itself, rather than requiring the services of a third party to spin a good news story from inadequate sum parts, or parts that aren’t performing, and that resorting to the use of ‘strat comms’ is a tacit admission of being on the back foot. As Mullen states,

“To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate.”

However, if Mullen favours the more the traditionalist, pared down method of spokesmen, regular press briefings and (presumably escorted / embedded) media access, then this need not preclude any strat comm element.

In fact, it is useful to look at why the traditional position evolved, expanding to encompass many more techniques and initiatives within its repertoire.

Firstly, target audience is important to acknowledge. Spokesmen are fine, yet communicate less well with the local population. It is frequently observed that in many post-conflict or transitional societies, establishing a radio station in the local language is crucial as one of the first steps.

Furthermore, as out and out military solutions are seen as less and less suited to the type of problems faced in many theatres, more innovative ways of arriving at political solutions are being sought. The asymmetry of counter-insurgency has forced a rethink.

Secondly, when Mullen identifies credibility as an important area of focus, credibility among the local population also extends to credibility among journalists. The cosiness that Ignatius identifies between the military and the press (assuming for a moment that this assertion is true) has not always been the case.

Thus Mullen is a bit hopeful when he seems to hope that journalists simply swallow the line they are given in official press briefings as merely representative of what’s happening. Such briefings during the Vietnam War were referred to by journalists as the Five O’clock Follies.

The veteran British war correspondent, and later editor, Max Hastings, recalls in his memoirs a final bit of advice about dealing with military officials given to him by his editor as he left for Vietnam on one of his first assignments: “they lie, they lie, they lie.”

It seems possible / likely that Mullen was spurred into writing this piece by a combination of frustration at the perceived lack of progress on the ground, and earlier statements from within the administration with which he disagreed, where there had been some history to the debate on strategic communications among senior figures.

A few months prior to Mullen’s article, Richard Holbrooke, Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, stated to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (24 June 2009) that “a new integrated civilian-military strategic communications effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan” was being implemented.

He identified three ‘simultaneous goals’:

-          redefining our message;

-          connecting to the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the ground in new ways through cell phones, radio, and other means;

-          identifying and supporting key communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter extremists’ propaganda and present a positive alternative.

This would seem to contain elements of the ‘new’ strategic communications that Mullen is sceptical of. There is enough evidence here, Mullen would argue, to criticise the approach as excessively jargonised and dotted with buzz words: a triumph of style over substance, when substance should be bolster by the right support for the boots on the ground.

Although there are no proven links between the difference of opinion between Holbrooke and Mullen, to speculate that there are is quite convincing. They certainly don’t seem to be singing from the same hymn sheet (McChrystal likewise was no fan of Holbrooke, apparently).

As one commentator noted at the time, however, whether the links are tenuous or not, such differences in opinion suggest that the administration can’t make its mind up about what to do in Afghanistan; the Rolling Stone episode suggests this continues to be true.

The difference between what Mullen and Holbrooke intend is the relative positioning of the arguments. If Mullen seeks to dismiss strat comms as style over substance, surely strat comms would respond that his is his department to supply the substance. No communications practitioner cannot communicate what is patently without foundation, if his or her reputation is to remain in one piece.

So far none of this is mutually exclusive or contradictory. One is positioned further downstream than the other, and strat comms must take account of the increasingly complex media environment in which conflicts are fought. Mullen is essentially on the frontline, at the coalface of policy execution, while Holbrooke is a civilian charged with communicating the positives when they are few and far between.

If critics point to the often jargon- and theory-heavy discourse of narratives, counter-narratives, information ecology and so on – “the ambitions and dangers” – as a cynical ploy to blind and bend opinions falsely in the absence of any mediation from an objective sense of justice or equanimity, then at this point strat comms becomes distasteful to many, papering over injustice and legitimate grievances of the injured.

The crucial factor is the mediating sense of justice that must be seen to prevail, whether we are talking about a spokesman and press briefing or a newly-set up radio station, whether things are going well or not.

Of course, communications becomes much easier when what is to be communicated is going well, but when it doesn’t, more than ever the newer and the more traditional school of comms need to communicate first and foremost among themselves, and reconcile their relative positions as mutually beneficial, not mutually exclusive.

Guy Gabriel

Student enrollment is rapidly outpacing expectations at an AMISOM pilot school project meant to encourage parents of Jazeera village in southern Mogadishu to bring their children for free primary education.  Initially just nine students signed up for the program. Within 30 days the school roster had 97 names, and now 210 students are enrolled.

The parents have not been left behind either.  Many adults have registered themselves to take advantage of the free public education, which has been absent in Somalia for the last 20 years since the ouster of former president Mohamed Siad Barre.  The latest AMISOM programme marks a step by the peacekeeping mission to battle illiteracy in Somalia.  Statistics on Somalia’s literacy rate are scant, but one estimate by UNICEF says just 24 percent of females between the age of 15 and 24 can read in the country. 

Education become a luxury after Barre was deposed, leaving many poor Somalis like the people of Jazeera and their children uneducated.  Now the education-hungry villagers and their children are posing challenges to AMISOM, which is struggling to provide them with books, desks and other educational materials.  Despite the lack of supplies, students are eager to attend class.  Hani Ahmed, a 9-year-old girl, is elated by the opportunity to attend the start-up school, which has yet to be named. 

“We did not have a school around before this was opened,” she said.  “This school was started by elders and AMISOM. I learn English and the Quran at the moment. The school is free. We don’t pay anything. I want to study hard in order to get a job when I finish school.”

Located in the expansive Wadajir district of southern Mogadishu, the population of Jazeera has sharply risen over the years as many civilians flee violence in other parts of the chaotic capital.  Security in the area is better than other parts of Mogadishu in large part due to the presence of the Jazeera training camp, where AMISOM peacekeepers train Somali government forces.

Due to lack of resources the students of Jazeera school have been forced to study in a refurbished former sweets factory.  During the morning children attend classes on the Quran, English, mathematics and geography, while parents and other adult learners attend similar classes in the afternoon.

Funds are in short supply too.  “We urge well-wishers to support us,” said Abdullahi Ibrahim, one of volunteer teachers.   “Our country has been ravaged by illiteracy, but if many students get an education it would have a positively impact. Extremism will be checked and our children will not be easily lured into fighting or even brainwashed.”

Maj. Nelson Ahebwa, an AMISOM peacekeeper with the Civil Military Unit, or CIMIC, is one of the pioneers of the project.   CIMIC launched the initiative, and Ahebwa is happy to see their work paying off as increasingly more Somalis enroll their children and themselves in classes.

“This is my happiest day in life,” said Ahebwa, who has already begun groundwork for similar such school in other areas of Mogadishu. “When I first met the elders last month, many were skeptical, although they seemed really interested. The number of students has shot from nine to nearly a 100 within month. We will lobby for support from donors and agencies like UNICEF to assist the students and the school.”

By Guled Mohamed  Senior Press Officer AU/UN Information Support Team

Nearly two years ago al-Shabab fighters colluded with a Quranic teacher to kidnap 20 children from the Fagah area of north Mogadishu and conscripted the youths.  One of the children captured and forced to fight by the militant group was a 12-year-old who goes by the name Sharif.  He spoke to reporters in April at Mogadishu’s Villa Somalia Presidential Palace, where he now lives under the watchful eye of the AMISOM commander.  Sharif said al-Shabab often intoxicates its fighters, who are mostly under age. He showed journalists a swelling on his right bicep, where he said his al-Shabab handlers injected him with an unknown drug that supposedly gave him superhuman fighting powers.  Sharif’s military training began shortly after capture, he said, offering a full account of what happened in lengthy remarks transcribed below.

I used to live in Fagah area of Mogadishu with my parents and siblings. One day our Quranic teacher took us to his house to go and pray for a sick woman. As soon as we reached his house we were surrounded by masked al-Shabab armed men. They fired at us and a bullet hit close to the teacher’s legs. He fled and left us.

I don’t know exactly when they kidnapped us, but it was when Abdullahi Yusuf was still in power, some time six months before he left. The next day before we left I saw our Quranic teacher receiving money from al-Shabab officials presumably for delivering us to them. I think he was a swindler who took money in order to enlist us with al-Shabab. They took us to Modmodey, where we joined a larger group and were all taught rifle handling and shooting skills before deployment.

The training camp was big. They divided us into smaller groups. We started receiving military training. They taught us how to fire and service a rifle. We were taught everything from pistols to AK-47 rifles. I can dismantle and assemble any rifle. We are also taught ambush skills. After a few months we were deployed around the country. I was among those sent to Beletweyne.

In Beletweyne I took part in many battles, including the fighting against the Ahlul Sunnah group in the central regions. They kept rotating us after a few months. I was then deployed to Mogadishu. When I came to Mogadishu I only saw two out of my former 20 classmates who were kidnapped together. I don’t know where the others went. I believe they must have died.

The al-Shabab commanders always injected us with a drug before going out to fight. The drug gave us dreamlike bravery. I was so high and so strong I thought I could simply grab our enemies and throw them away like stones. It was not true and I lost many colleagues during these battles.

I have not spoken to or seen my parents since I was kidnapped. I fear that if I go and look for them the al-Shabab will find out and trace them to finish them off. A month ago, an older boy in my group secretly told us he had spoken to a government commander in the nearby district and was planning to escape. He had arranged everything with the commander.

When the day to escape finally came, we silently walked out pretending we were going for a routine patrol. We had to move out in groups of two to avoid suspicion. We finally reached the destination where we were supposed to be picked up. That’s how I got where I am now. I have been here for almost a month now.

In Villa Somalia, I don’t do anything. I eat and sleep with the AMISOM forces. The commander is a good person. He has been very kind to me. If there is anything I miss most and wish I could do it is to go to school. I just want to get an education.

By Guled Mohamed

Senior Press Officer AU/UN Information Support Team

With virtually no public services available in Mogadishu, one of AMISOM’s most important tasks has been to ease the suffering of the population through humanitarian assistance.  Every day around 800 ailing Somalis seek medical assistance from the two outpatient field clinics run by AMISOM doctors. A similar number of residents also get their daily supply of safe water for domestic use from the African Union peacekeepers. And since most international humanitarian agencies have withdrawn from southern Somalia owing to security concerns, Somalis in need are increasingly looking towards AMISOM for help.

Somali women queuing outside AMISOM's medical centre.

“Every other time I visit the field clinics I am really saddened,” AMISOM Spokesman Maj. Ba-Hoku Barigye said during one of his many visits to the main outpatient clinic near the airport run by Ugandan doctors.  “The suffering of the population is just too much. We have gone beyond our ability to help the population. We firmly believe that with the right support AMISOM and the government can really save more lives in Somalia.”

AMISOM Senior Humanitarian Officer Abdul Diabagate the suffering of the population calls for a more robust approach.  Diabagate appealed for a more vigorous and timely intervention by the world to ease suffering in Somalia, which is in the grips of one of the worst humanitarian crises the country has seen in two decades of internal conflict.

“AMISOM continues to provide critically needed humanitarian assistance under increasingly life threatening conditions,” said Diabagate, who oversees donations of drugs and medical equipment sent by the Somali diaspora, the British government and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM.  “It is important to note that our little humanitarian assistance is easing civilians suffering, but as you can see our interventions are not enough. We need more support and hope that the international community, including world leaders, will take advantage of AMISOM’S presence on the ground to advance humanitarian issues.”

Somalis queuing outside AMISOM's medical centre.

An AMISOM sentry controlling the access to AMISOM's medical facility.

Mahado Ali is among the scores of Somalis receiving vital AMISOM humanitarian assistance.  With no income and a family to support, the 65-year-old widow and mother of five is grateful for the support.

“We live just opposite the base,” Ali said while clutching her 3-year-old son Ahmed Hassan in a queue with other patients waiting to be seen by an AMISOM doctor at the clinic.  “My son has diarrhea.  I came to treat him free of charge at the clinic. The peacekeepers also provide us with safe drinking water. Our safety is also guaranteed here. Life would have been terrible without the support we receive from AMISOM.”

Several tents inside the base serve as the main in-patient hospital, where dozens of ailing Somalis can be seen lying in the open. The facility badly needs refurbishing.  An AMISOM nurse who declined to be named summarized Somalia’s critical humanitarian situation this way.

“We virtually use the same supplies meant for the peacekeepers to assist these poor people,” she said.  “We have the capacity to assist many more but we just can’t. If only the world could provide much more support, the suffering here would have been history.”

By Guled Mohamed

Senior Press Officer AU/UN Information Support Team

The British public is used to Afghanistan, bored by Iraq and probably indifferent to Somalia. The benighted country in the Horn of Africa tends to enter our consciousness only when pirates pop up and kidnap British ships, sailors and the occasional naive yachting couple. And even when it does, it tends to fade away pretty fast. The media moves onto the next story. Life goes on.

Somalis using a public service vehicle in a suburb of south east Mogadishu

Yet the neglect of the country by the mainstream media is both surprising and disappointing. Although there is no lake of oil to protect, Somalia should grab Western policymakers’ attention for the very good reason that failure here is likely to have some extremely unpleasant consequences around the world. Don’t take my word for it. Just have a look at how many diaspora Somalis have been involved in suicide attacks in Somalia in recent months. It is quite possible that dual-national Somalis, having had a thorough terrorist training in Somalia, could launch future attacks in the UK, US and elsewhere. As the killers of the Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai understood, a British passport can be quite useful.

To summarise and simplify the position pertaining on the ground in Mogadishu today, on the one hand there is an alliance of local Islamists and their Al Qaeda allies, on the other there is the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom), grossly under-resourced both in men and materiel, together with the fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Neither side, at current strength, is able to overpower the other. There are enough deluded Islamists to hold much of Mogadishu and much of the country, but not enough to take over. Amisom is holding the breach. It is able to take more territory but requires more manpower to retain it. The result is a messy, bloody and thorough unsatisfactory stalemate.

One man doing an exceptional job communicating the parlous position in Mogadishu is Major Ba-Hoku Barigye, Amisom’s Ugandan spokesman. Google him and you will see all sorts of lucid and punchy commentary on attacks in the Somali capital. Like his Force Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, he knows that everyone could and should be doing better.

AMISOM Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha

International donors could be honouring their pledges to assist this country that finds itself on the front-line of the war against Al Qaeda. In the latest UN report on Somalia, issued on 31 December last year, it was reported that of the $58m pledged to the TFG by foreign donors in Brussels last April, the government had received $5.6m. That isn’t good enough. African troop-contributing nations could, and should, be doing better, too. Nigeria has offered to provide troops, but recently had a loss of nerve, observing that there was no peace to keep in Mogadishu. So far, only Uganda and Burundi have stepped up to the plate. This is not enough to enable the African Union to deliver on its commitment – its very raison d’etre – to provide African solutions to African problems.

It needn’t be all that difficult. If Amisom is properly resourced – yes, we know that all generals want more soldiers and kit, but this mission really does need urgent reinforcement – Somalia could turn the corner. With more territory under its belt the TFG could exploit the opportunity to show Somalis, for the first time in two decades, that effective government is a real possibility. Amisom could accelerate the ongoing training of TFG forces, whose long-term responsibility it will be to provide security. The alternative, as we see every time a bearded fanatic self-detonates, is national implosion and an increasingly fertile base for Al Qaeda.

Communicating that challenge is not so difficult. Policymakers in America and Europe just need to listen.

Justin Marozzi is a Senior Associate of Albany Associates.

Until very recently, only Mauritania among the Arab countries attracted less attention in the British media than Yemen. Not any more: since 25 December 2009, Yemen is mentioned more than any other Arab country except Iraq. The past month alone has seen greater media interest in Yemen than the entire previous year. Although news moves in cycles and some in the media will lose interest, Yemen has now made an unwelcome, and for the foreseeable future, permanent entry into the Western media landscape, with 2010 certain to be a year of greater interest than ever before.

The threat from Yemen

When looking at how Yemen is represented in the media, the language and context provided are all-important. Many of the words being used to describe the significance of the failed Detroit plot have been in use in a particular context for almost a decade: ‘War on Terror,’ Guantanamo, Al Qaeda. In fact, a number of newspapers have suggested that the decade ended as it started – under attack from Al Qaeda – thereby drawing the events of 9/11 into the current focus on Yemen. This then gives a sense of timelessness, removing the need for specific detail as readers think they are dealing with a familiar subject. In addition, some suggest, without any substantiation, that this time there is something “more extreme” about this ‘new’ generation of Yemeni Al Qaeda.
In fact, the perceived threat is not always restricted to Yemen alone; virtually every country from Mauritania to Pakistan is mentioned as having some sort of nefarious connection to, or unspecified complicity in, transnational jihadism, whether it is as unintentional host or deeper involvement. A few European countries are also mentioned in this regard, including the UK and Germany, and parts of the coverage have focused on Britons who are said to have trained in camps in Yemen. The main problem lies in communicating a reasonable sense of proportion to the threat and what to do about it, which has always been a huge stumbling block in the ‘War on Terror.’
The need for calm analysis

The precise relationship between Yemen and Al Qaeda is of great interest, and consequently, so is the precise relationship between Yemen and the West. It is common to see such descriptions as “safe haven”, “breeding ground”, “major stronghold” that is “awash with al-Qaeda terrorists” who are allowed to flourish in “ungoverned spaces.” The reader, on hearing such key words, immediately realises what he or she is supposed to think: danger, although no one can be more specific. While few in the West disregard the possibility that danger to Western interests – as typified by an attempt to down an airplane over US soil – can originate in some capacity on Yemeni territory, some in the media adopt the ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ approach, and take a more extreme line in their assessments than others.

Two such examples: Yemen “appears to be a land with an excessive capacity for violence” (Daily Express), and Yemen “is weak, and the country is deeply divided, tribalistic and violent” (Daily Telegraph). At the same time, it is important to make three main points. Firstly, not all Western media coverage is like this. Among the more cogent analysts, the need for communication and dialogue is seen as the priority, both out of principle and pragmatic necessity. Secondly, there is virtually no appetite in the media for any troops on the ground in a manner that would resemble Iraq or Afghanistan. Thirdly, in the coverage, particularly when trying to evaluate the threat level, speculation is always far greater than evidence, with near-hysteria often resulting, often making the same points: ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, nearly 100 Yemenis still in Guantanamo, and “failing state.” This often has the effect of multiplying the capacity of Al Qaeda, and its potential to inflict harm.

What the coverage tells Western readers about Yemen
Yemen is seen through the prism of terrorist threat, so the reader could be forgiven for concluding that it is only Al Qaeda in its international dimension that makes Yemen of any interest to Western audiences. Yemen becomes a place where all the fears and attributes associated with Al Qaeda in the Western public mind, whether rightly or wrongly, have found something solid around which to coalesce. Too much of this type of reporting has the effect of justifying to many readers, who have no other information sources, that Yemen rightly is to be feared, with nothing that can be done about it.

In many cases, the ideology and spark for jihadism is thought to be inherent in the country, particularly in the tribal areas, which then infuses the people, even visitors such as the Nigerian accused of the failed Detroit plot. Yemen is sometimes labelled simply a “sympathetic environment,” which is open to quite wide interpretation – ranging from ‘mountainous’ to ‘ungoverned spaces’ to ‘complicit government.’  This ignores the myriad factors and opportunism that often combine to provide a favourable environment. The Western media spotlight only focuses very weakly on the local factors that influence such groups, including poverty and corruption. The editorial line is generally interested in why the West is involved, and much less interested in the country caught in the crossfire. Extremism is thought to be much more commonly accepted than in reality, and readers hear very little about other sections of Yemeni society.
Despite considerations such as the Houthi rebellion in the far north, and the ongoing dispute with southern secessionists, it is assumed in the West that top priority should automatically go to fighting Al Qaeda, and suspicion arises if the zeal with which Al Qaeda is opposed by the West is not matched in Yemeni public statements. Increasingly, it now is.
The ‘either with us or against us’ logic of the ‘War on Terror’ suffuses the coverage, and Yemenis caring about their local or national disputes or conflicts – or even just opposing the West in a political sense – are very easily conflated with transnational jihadism, as typified by Al Qaeda. Identity is made to appear fixed, not fluid as in reality.

What the coverage tells the Arab world about the West’s approach

There are three main lessons to draw from this kind of coverage. Firstly, there is a huge gap in understanding the dynamics of Yemen. Secondly, Western interest, from the level of the media down, appears reactionary. Thirdly, the information flows are asymmetric, with very little Yemeni input in the media narrative. To approach the Al Qaeda problem in isolation and to the exclusion of other issues – which is what significant parts of Western media coverage is doing – has the effect of confirming to audiences in the Arab world that intentions towards Yemen are predominantly hostile. All of Yemen is painted as a threat, and there is little space for differentiation, dialogue, or to analyse common ground.

However, generally the West views Yemen as an ally (one “we can do business with”) in the ‘War on Terror,’ often meaning that the person, institution or country in question marks a point of focus where Western interests intersect. However, in this case, questioned commitment is also an issue for some. There is plenty of focus on Western policy towards Yemen, which is all said to be supportive of President Salih. This has two main effects. Firstly, foreign backing makes Salih seem incapable of effective rule. Secondly, Yemen runs the risk of having its legitimacy as a state conferred on them by Western endorsement, something certain to negatively impact the government’s domestic legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.

Guy Gabriel is a journalist and adviser to Arab Media Watch. The article first appeared in today’s Al Quds Al Arabi.

Of the main outcomes to emerge from the London Conference, helping reintegrate Taliban fighters via support for a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund and negotiations with the Taliban have taken centre stage. As the conference communiqué put it, there is a need to:  “offer an honourable place in society to those willing to renounce violence, participate in the free and open society and respect the principles that are enshrined in the Afghan Constitution , cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and pursue their political goals peacefully”.
As these latest plans were vaunted by the great and good at Lancaster House, it was left to those towards the fringes of Afghanistan’s political scene – a human rights campaigner, an ex-minister, a former British Diplomat, and a media mogul – to provide the serious debate and analysis. The foursome were speaking at a Carnegie Europe event in Parliament’s Grand Committee room, and the first to apply his not insignificant acumen to ‘current thinking’ was Nader Nadery of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). As someone who has made the pursuit of universal human rights in Afghanistan his business, his primary concern is the Taliban’s profound lack of respect for them.

“The truth of the matter is that the Taliban’s core principles are at odds with international law”, said Nadery with trademark phlegmatism. “With regards to women’s rights, they do not want to give women space or include women in the political process in any way. When we talk about bringing the Taliban into the process what it really means is giving up on democracy, women’s rights, and human rights in Afghanistan. “If you notice Gordon Brown’s and Barack Obama’s recent speeches on Afghanistan it is remarkable how they have suddenly stopped referring to democracy and human rights. There’s a reason for this. The Obama strategy is a military-orientated one, with the ultimate goal being defeating the Taliban – rather than the pursuit of the rule of law, good governance, or human rights”. Nadery went on to assert that you can’t successfully reintegrate members of the Taliban unless you have a strong state, particularly a state that is functioning at the district level throughout the country.

Rather the main aim should be to strengthen Afghan institutions and tackle corruption via vetting and by marginalizing the corrupt. Moreover, when they have been applied, such measures are beginning to reap dividends, “In Kandahar, for example, people are starting to have a higher level of respect for the Afghan National Army (ANA). This is because a very clear strategy was put in place for its development and there was rigorous vetting of the army. Unfortunately the same has never happened with the ANP [Afghan National Police]”.
However, it was another recently floated idea which provoked the strongest opposition from the Human Rights Commissioner – namely the suggestion that the International community should consider playing ‘the tribal card’ by cultivating and supporting specific tribes, particularly those which rival the Taliban in Afghan Provinces, to gain political or military advantage. “There is no tribal solution” said Nadery definitively. “We no longer have the same tribal structure in Afghanistan as we used to. Most tribal elders have been replaced by local warlords and more than 60% of the population is made up of young people. The warlords do not have popular support. And creating militia groups could increase conflict and could even lead to a civil war [in Afghanistan]”.
Meanwhile his co-panelist, Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former Afghan Interior Minister, argued that thus far there had never been any examples of successful reintegration [of the Taliban] in Afghanistan. “The question really should be who are they [the Taliban]? They are an assortment of different groups fighting for different reasons. Some of them are transnational and linked to Mullah Omar. Others are not. We are talking about different tribes, unemployed youths, drug traffickers… and the rest.
“What is certain is that if you establish good governance these people will go. We need the military to create the time and space to enable development to take place and we still need to convince ordinary Afghans that it is worth fighting for the government. On the tribal issue – you first need to build a state. Build it and they will come to you”!

For his part, Sir Hilary Synott, the former British High Commissioner to Pakistan, fundamentally disagreed with the idea of negotiating with the real or the ‘ideological’ Taliban. “If we think that negotiating with Mullah Omar is a solution, we should think again. You have to distinguish what you mean when you say Taliban. After that the following question remains. If you exclude the real hardliners, can any group you deal with bring you a proper deal? Let’s not forget Mullah Omar will not compromise and will not bring anything like what Afghanistan expects from democracy”.
Saad Mohseni, Director of one of Afghanistan’s leading media Companies the Moby Group, added his voice to the debate suggesting that there was nothing new about attempts to talk to the Taliban, “In 2008 there was a dialogue between King Abdullah and President Karzai, which was given the go ahead by President Bush. This culminated in the Ramadan dinner in Saudi Arabia last year. Taliban leaders met with the King and Karzai’s brother was present. The Saudi’s have taken over the dialogue now – although it never involved the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. “Negotiating with the Taliban is not as simple as it seems” he added. “Who will host the meetings? Who will attend? Who will the Taliban negotiate with? The Russians say that the Taliban should negotiate with the Northern Alliance as the Taliban already represent the Pashtuns.
“However, you cannot exclude the Taliban. What is really needed is a Bonn two to bring them into the process and press the reset button for the Afghan government. But economic development and justice is just as important. You have to be very careful about negotiations. If there is some ‘grand bargain’ we [the media and civil society] will be the first ones who are sacrificed”.

It’s probably of little comfort to the ordinary Afghan, but as the politicians at the London Conference struggled to find a form of words to best describe their latest position on Afghanistan at least one room in the British parliament was witness to a meaningful discussion on the future of that country. Then again, the debate did seem to be worryingly at odds with the not-so-new strategy of negotiations with the Taliban and plans to forge further alliances with warlords.

Martin Battersby is a Senior Associate at Albany Associates

The media profile of Darfur shot up enormously once the label ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ was applied, although technically the phrase used was the “world’s greatest humanitarian and human rights catastrophe.” This is commonly standardised to ‘world’s worst…’

In a press conference in Nairobi on 19 March 2004, with the 10-year anniversary of Rwanda approaching, Mukesh Kapila, the then-United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, applied the label to Darfur.

This had the desired effect: to gain the media attention that was needed to counteract the lack of diplomatic interest Kapila felt he was getting in publicising Darfur. One explanation for this lack of interest points towards the fact that the situation in Darfur conflicted unhelpfully with the more upbeat direction that the North-South was heading in.

Around four months earlier, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland described Darfur as “one of the worst in the world” (5 December 2003), but this assessment failed to register particularly deeply.

In an interview a few years ago, Kapila described the difficulties he faced in 2003 in bringing the situation to the attention of the wider international community, and reported the resistance he met within the UN itself. According to him, “senior people in the Department of Political Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat accused [him] of being unstable and hysterical.” His stance on Darfur effectively ended his career in the mainstream of the UN, he suggests.

Nonetheless, Kapila describes the media response as “electrifying” – but added, referring to the subsequent diplomatic response:

“I consider that a failure because of course the job had been done…A mass murder was more or less over.”

Egeland suggests in his memoir, A Billion Lives, how Pakistan’s presidency of the UN Security Council kept Darfur off the agenda, as Sudan was an ally. He also criticises the unsustainability of the wait-and-see approach in Western capitals.

However, Egeland reports that while political pressure was still weak and ineffective, the “only positive development” was the generous funding that had been unlocked.

On 15 September 2003, the Greater Darfur Special Initiative was launched, which requested a comparatively modest $23 million; on 9 April 2004, the UN launched the Revised Appeal for the Sudan Assistance Programme (ASAP 2004) that requested in excess of $115 million, which included programmes to provide food aid, health care, agricultural assistance, relief supplies including shelter, water and sanitation, education, protection and coordination. The US was by far the largest donor.

Egeland describes how the “nothing less than heroic” efforts of almost 14,000 Sudanese and international aid workers have resulted in substantial improvements in malnutrition levels and mortality rates. Over half a million tonnes of food were delivered in 2006 alone.

Despite the undoubted success in unlocking significant funding, one observation is that such formulae in the media are quite resistant to change – the media tend simply to lower their voices rather than introduce a more complicated and nuanced view – giving the impression that unchanging situations exist in perpetuity, thereby ignoring successes which are a vital part of the evaluation process.

With Darfur being described as ‘the world’s worst’ as recently as last month, legitimate questions can be asked as to what does a descriptive, and sensationalist, formula such as this create in greater proportions: heat or light? Or at the very least, one can question whether the ratio of heat to light is balanced enough to promote the most effective response.

The inevitable requirement for triage in responding to natural disasters or complex emergencies means that the process is influenced by a number of factors other than need alone, such as media attention and pressure, resulting in the neglect of those upon whom only a weak spotlight is shone, if at all.

Darfur is not the first time that the label ‘the world’s worst’ has been applied. Below is a list of the last two decades’ hotspots, using examples taken from the British media, though none can seriously challenge Darfur for prominence. Notably, Somalia was described as ‘world’s worst’ as far back as 1992, and reappears now, almost 18 years later.

1990:  Angola

1992: Somalia

1994: Rwanda

1996: Zaire

2001: Afghanistan

2002: Zimbabwe

2004: Darfur

2005/ 06: Congo (less popular choice than Darfur, but UN said it all the same)

2007: Somalia

2008: Congo

2009: Somalia / East Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda).

Occasionally, non-African countries such as Tajikistan and Colombia are mentioned in connection with the ‘world’s worst’, but such a statement is normally qualified by a regional specification: “world’s worst…in Asia,” or “world’s worst…in the Americas.” Only Afghanistan in 2001 has been able to wrench the title of outright “world’s worst…” from the African continent.

One interesting counterview to mention is the tsunami that rose off the west coast of Sumatra on 26 December 2004. In the media, the description ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ was very uncommonly applied, which in a sense is counterintuitive, given the sheer scale of the disaster.

Egeland describes the global response to the tsunami in his memoir. At the first OCHA press conference at midday on 27 December 2004, the room was full beyond the usual UN accredited journalists – a “remarkable” turnout – with many approaching him at the end and urging him to conduct daily press conferences, which he did for the next 30 or so days. The story was automatically huge.

In terms of generosity of response, Egeland recalls “fund raising [was] setting new records each day,” such that they had “a hard time recording the rapid increase in relief funds.” This amounted to a total of $13.5 billion, meaning $7,100 for every affected person. By comparison, $3 dollars were spent on each person affect during the 2004 floods in Bangladesh. 

Although there were plenty of lessons that could be learnt from the response, The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition reported that “palpable evidence of recovery” was visible within a few months thanks to the efforts of all those involved.  In addition, following the immediate period of the aftermath, former US president Bill Clinton became UN special envoy for tsunami recovery, a very high profile figure that could keep the longer-term recovery and reconstruction in the world’s attention.

What this suggests is that the label ‘the world’s worst’ has as much to do with salesmanship, publicity-seeking (not in any negative sense) and advocacy as it does cold, objective statement of fact. Congo advocates (among many other candidates) have always wondered why the comparative silence on their cause.

The tsunami was not described as ‘the world’s worst’ because the magnitude of the disaster was painstakingly obvious, with no triage required for it to top agendas. On this occasion there was no obstructive hierarchy of sceptical diplomats, politicians, journalists, editors or readers in need of convincing of its newsworthiness. The world swung into action in a way it doesn’t to other, more complicated situations which, as Darfur has shown, really take some effort to publicise.

Guy Gabriel is a journalist and adviser to Arab Media Watch.